proved tempting to parody Whewell's position in the debate by treating it as a straightforward encounter between an arch-empiri cist and an arch-rationalist. There is, however, a danger that an emphasis on the necessitarian and a priori elements in Whewell's philosophy may well obscure the unmistakable empirical emphasis in Wheweirs theory of science. I think it is time to begin to redress the balance, by focusing attention on the significant 'empiricist* strains in Whewell's philosophy of science. One of the most impor tant of those strains is connected with the operation which Whewell calls 'the consilience of inductions'. Indeed, of all the fanciful neologisms which Whewell coined (including 'the colligation of facts', 'the explication of conceptions', 'the decomposition of facts' and 'the superinduction of concep tions') , none denoted a more fertile methodological process nor a more important doctrine in Whewell's methodology, than 'the con silience of inductions'. This fact alone would more than justify a close scrutiny of this doctrine. However, a fuller understanding of the nature of Whewell's views on consilience is not only vital to a comprehension of his philosophy of science, but is also the key to his historiography of science, for it is largely in terms of consiliences that Whewell formulates his theory of the progressive nature of scientific growth and evolution. This paper is designed to give a brief explication of Whewell's notion of the consilience of induc tions, along with an assessment of the r?le which consilience and related concepts play in Whewell's history and philosophy of science.
In the fourteenth aphorism concerning science of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840), Whewell offers what is probably his briefest characterization of the nature of consilience:
The Consilience of Inductions takes place when an Induction, ob tained from one class of facts, coincides with an induction, obtained from another class. This Consilience is a test of the truth of the Theory in which it occurs.1
To paraphrase, if two chains of 'inductive reasoning* from seeming ly different classes of phenomena lead us to the same 'conclusion', a consilience of inductions has occurred.
In the light of this aphorism, there are two significant questions to ask initially about the consilience of inductions: (a) precisely what is involved in a consilience?2 and (b) why should a successful consilience count as 'a test of the truth of the theory'? It is these exegetical questions I will examine in Sections I and II below. In Section III, I will discuss how Whewell applies the notion of con silience to the history of science; while in Section IV I will look at the ways in which subsequent methodologists and logicians of sci ence have reacted to Whewell's requirement of consilience.
I
Because the notion of consilience is so closely connected with
Whewell's doctrine of induction (being effectively the result of two or more inductions leading to the same general proposition), it is important to be clear at the outset about the nature of Whewellian induction. It is generally accepted that Whewell radically trans which achieve a consilience are true and can be known with cer tainty to be true. That he is giving an accurate reflection of patterns of belief in the scientific community is beyond doubt. But that he has failed to justify such beliefs is equally clear.
In spite of the structural weaknesses in Whewell's argument, his interest in the problem of consilience was of long duration. Not only does it figure in almost all of his published methodological works from 1833 to 1860, but it was even a matter of concern to him in some of his early unpublished writings on scientific method. In the revised version, therefore, a theory becomes almost certain if, in addition to explaining facts 'detached from those which were used in the generalization' (which was all the first draft required), it explains facts of a kind 'uncontemplated' when the theory was discovered. Whewell still has not put the point as succinctly as he will later do. But two things are clear from this early manuscript:
(1) that Whewell was concerned with the problem of consilience at an early stage, and (2) It is really the accretion of a number of different inductive 'proofs' all pointing towards the same conclusion which persuades the scien tists that he has discovered a necessary truth. Our belief in the truth of an hypothesis becomes so strong that we cannot 'conceive it possible to doubt' the truth of that given hypothesis.37
There are basically two factors mitigating against the cogency of Whewell's claim that consiliences of induction guarantee truth.
The one factor, which I have already mentioned, is the logical one that it is always possible for a universal theory to be refuted, no matter how successful it has been in achieving consiliences. The second factor is a development within Whewell's own philosophy of science. He goes to some pains to argue (more or less aping Kant) that experience cannot attest to the necessity of scientific truths.38
But if experience, no matter how extensive, cannot be used as evidence for the necessary character of scientific truths, then the consilience of inductions, which is manifestly an experiential mat ter, cannot justify our claim that a certain lawlike statement or hypothesis is a necessary truth. In spite of the fact that Whewell generally regards a successful consilience as an infallible sign of the truth of the theory in which it occurs, he occasionally is less emphatic about identifying consiliatory power with truth. He points out, for example, that the phlogiston theory was capable of explaining facts in such diverse domains as combustion and acidifi cation.39 Strictly speaking, therefore, the phlogiston theory achieved a 'truth-insuring' consilience of inductions. Nonetheless, as new phenomena emerged which the phlogiston theory was unable to explain (or able to explain only by ad hoc and 'inadmissible operations'), that hypothesis was abandoned. Similarly, he concedes (without using this language) that the emission theory of light achieved a consilience in explaining reflection, refraction and (with some difficulty) the colors of thin plates.
John Stuart Mill was quick to see the question-begging character of Whewell's arguments about the truth-guaranteeing nature of consiliences. In his System of Logic (1843), he focusses specifically on Whewell's analogy between establishing the validity of a cypher and proving the truth of an hypothesis. Mill, who held that correct prediction is no more reliable a test of truth than sufficiency to explain the known evidence, argues that:
If anyone, from examining the greater part of a long inscription, can interpret the characters so that the inscription gives a rational meaning in a known language, there is a strong presumption that his interpretation is correct; but I do not think the presumption much increased by his being able to guess the few remaining (2), with its content-increasing gains at no loss of formal coherence and unity, is an example of a successful consilience of inductions. Whewell takes the view that it is a defining condition of progress in science that 'refuted* theories which are retained but modified must ascend to higher and higher levels of generality (by CI2 or CI3), whilst converging towards systemic simplicity and unity (by CIX). As he puts it, we have to notice a distinction which is found to prevail in the 
